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Sonya F. P. Ziaja* 
RULES AND VALUES IN VIRTUAL 
OPTIMIZATION OF CALIFORNIA HYDROPOWER 
ABSTRACT 
Optimization models for California’s hydropower system are 
designed to be decision-support tools and aids for climate 
adaptation decision-making. In practice, they fall short of this 
goal. One potential explanation is that optimization models are 
not more successful because they are built on, and depend on, a 
misrepresentation of law and politics. The legal reality of 
California’s hydropower system is a web of networked 
jurisdictions of multiple federal and state agencies, with varying 
levels of coordination, long periods of legally obligated stability 
with rigid rules, and prone to conflict, but with multiple 
procedures for conflict resolution. Barriers to climate adaptation 
from that mix vary according to where a given dam is located. 
The virtual institutional arrangements represented in 
optimization models are not a simplification of existing 
arrangements. Instead, they are a dramatic replacement. That 
replacement is deliberate and reasoned. As seen in two 
optimization models supported by the state of California, 
CALVIN and INFORM, the operation of the optimization 
function of computer models depends on a virtual system of rules 
that are centrally controlled, coordinated, nimble, and without 
the possibility of conflict (let alone conflict resolution). But that 
smooth virtual system comes with a real cost. Institutional 
economics suggests that this mismatch between existing formal 
law and represented law may upend the results of models, since 
value is determined from institutional context. 
INTRODUCTION 
Here’s the story: California—the sixth largest economy in the world, 
home to 38 million people, 95 endangered species, and 189,454 miles of river1—is 
 
* JD, MSc. Ziaja is a PhD candidate at the University of Arizona, School of Geography and 
Development. This article comes out of research for her dissertation. It has been greatly aided by 
discussions with Carl Bauer (PhD advisor), Guido Franco and Susan Wilhelm (California Energy 
Commission), Helen Ingram, Jay Lund, Maurice Roos and Michael Anderson (California Department of 
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dependent on a variable and fragile hydrological system to support life, energy, and 
ways of living. That system is vulnerable to climate change. Because the effects of 
future climate conditions on water and energy systems will diverge from historical 
experience, decision-makers and stakeholders are dependent on computer 
models—which “probabilistically” forecast climatic changes and/or their potential 
downstream sequelae2—to evaluate the practical implications of climate change 
and devise timely harm-reduction policies. Over the past decade and a half, 
California administrative agencies have funded research to develop engineering 
models that could assist decision-making to manage strained resources (electricity 
and water) under conditions of climate change.3 But despite promising research 
 
Ziaja is also a research manager and research lead for the water-energy-climate nexus at the 
California Energy Commission. The views presented in this article do not necessarily represent the 
views of the Energy Commission. 
1. STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, STATE & FEDERALLY LISTED ENDANGERED & 
THREATENED ANIMALS IN CALIFORNIA (2017), https://nrm.dfg.ca.gov/FileHandler.ashx?Document
ID=109405&inline [https://perma.cc/SK96-5TRY]. 
 2. “Computer models” here includes everything from downscaled climate scenarios to engineering 
models of physical and natural systems, like hydropower and reservoir systems, which use climate 
scenarios as an input to the model. 
 3. See CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE CTR., OUR CHANGING CLIMATE —ASSESSING THE RISKS TO 
CALIFORNIA (2006), http://meteora.ucsd.edu/cap/pdffiles/CA_climate_Scenarios.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V9R2-B4AD]; see also CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE, SECOND CALIFORNIA CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT 
(2010), http://climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/reports/second_assessment.html [https://perma
.cc/ALH9-962R] (individual “final reports” available); CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE, OUR CHANGING 
CLIMATE 2012 VULNERABILITY & ADAPTATION TO THE INCREASING RISKS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE IN 
CALIFORNIA (2012), http://climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/reports/third_assessment/
index.html [https://perma.cc/325F-YH47]. See Research and Tool Development, CAL. NAT. RESOURCES 
AGENCY, http://resources.ca.gov/climate/safeguardinZg/research/ [https://perma.cc/9BLP-6GTY] 
(providing information on research portfolios being developed for California’s Fourth Climate 
Assessment); see also California Climate Change Assessments, CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/reports/climate_assessments.html [https://perma.cc/
5CDN-6ZF4] (providing general information on the California Climate Assessments). 
  For reasons described in discussion infra Part III.A.1, the California Energy Commission had 
been the primary state funder of climate related research until around 2010. Reports discussing the 
planned funding of climate related research and outcomes of that research include: CAL. ENERGY 
COMM’N, ELECTRIC PROGRAM INVESTMENT CHARGE 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2017), http://www.energy
.ca.gov/2017publications/CEC-500-2017-015/CEC-500-2017-015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SFF-ER6Y]; 
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, NATURAL GAS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (2016), http://www.
energy.ca.gov/2016publications/CEC-500-2016-063/CEC-500-2016-063.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBV8-
N8J7]; CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, ELECTRIC PROGRAM INVESTMENT CHARGE 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, 
(2016) http://www.energy.ca.gov/2016publications/CEC-500-2016-014/CEC-500-2016-014-CMF.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G2JJ-L4R8]; CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PUBLIC INTEREST ENERGY RESEARCH 2015 
ANNUAL REPORT (2016) http://www.energy.ca.gov/2016publications/CEC-500-2016-032/CEC-500-
2016-032-CMF.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EHY-LN2Z]; CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PUBLIC INTEREST ENERGY 
RESEARCH 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 73 (2015), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2015publications/CEC-500-
2015-009/CEC-500-2015-009-CMF.pdf [https://perma.cc/CEZ2-S3CA] (topics within the climate 
energy research area comprising $1.8 million of PIER funding and $165,000 from match funding, 23% 
of which went to hydropower modelling); CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PUBLIC INTEREST ENERGY 
RESEARCH 2012 ANNUAL REPORT (2013), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2013publications/CEC-500-2013-
013/CEC-500-2013-013-CMF.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3LK-JXKC]; CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PUBLIC 
INTEREST ENERGY RESEARCH PROGRAM 2010 ANNUAL REPORT (2011), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011
publications/CEC-500-2011-031/CEC-500-2011-031-CMF.PDF [https://perma.cc/8LT7-NLQQ]; CAL. 
ENERGY COMM’N, PUBLIC INTEREST ENERGY RESEARCH: A DECADE OF ADVANCING CALIFORNIA 
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results, almost none of these decision-support tools—nor their policy 
recommendations—have actually been adopted for use by decision-makers. I 
suggest that a potential reason for poor adoption rests in the model design itself, 
especially for optimization models of hydropower systems in legally complex 
landscapes. 
Optimization models are designed to weigh costs and benefits of multiple 
choices to produce a “least-cost” option, based on chosen criteria.4 These models 
largely ignore underlying substantive and procedural law and politics, as well as 
values inherent in, and produced by, both. 
The mismatch between the legal and political reality on the ground and 
how it is represented in optimization models is not an accident. It is deliberate and 
reasoned. To facilitate the optimization function, models of hydropower systems 
assume a uniform, centralized, coordinated system with decipherable values.5 
But what we have is a multi-jurisdiction and multi-objective legal system 
on the ground, where values can conflict and processes for institutional and 
operational change vary, and where no set of institutional arrangements is uniform 
across all river basins. Optimization models swap this “messy” legal and political 
reality for “cleaner” hypothetical institutional arrangements to determine the value 
of alternative allocation scenarios. 
Institutional economics offers a critique of this kind of replacement. 
Applied to optimization models of hydropower in California, institutional 
economics suggests that the method of weighting options in optimization models 
may be misrepresenting social and economic values when choosing between 
multiple objectives of reservoir management. In other words, the assumptions made 
in optimization models have the potential to render their results suspect to decision-
makers, because results are removed from the political and legal reality that 
hydropower managers and policy makers work in. A prescription for the disconnect 
follows from the institutionalist critique: include legal context in models. 
My purpose here is not to reject these tools. I argue, along with many 
other practitioners, that we are increasingly dependent on models for climate 
planning and adaptation. What I hope to demonstrate in this article is that these 
 
TECHNOLOGY (2009), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CEC-180-2009-004/CEC-180-2009-
004.PDF [https://perma.cc/HGS5-XVMG]; CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PIER 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 
(2004), http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/2004-04-01_500-04-010.PDF [https://perma.cc/ATG8-
Y3KZ]; 6 CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2004 ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE PIER PROGRAM: ENERGY-RELATED 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH PROJECT SUMMARIES (2005), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/
CEC-500-2005-055/CEC-500-2005-055-V6.PDF [https://perma.cc/G6B5-KC4H]. 
  Cf. Sacramento Water Allocation Model (SacWam), developed by the Stockholm 
Environmental Institute and financed by the State Water Resources Control Board. This model also took 
over a decade to develop and introduce to the public. See San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin 
Delta Estuary (Bay-Delta) Program, CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.waterboards.ca.
gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/bay_delta/sacwam/ [https://perma.cc/XU4X-DQAZ]; see also 
Sacramento Water Allocation Model (SacWam) Independent Peer Review Workshop, DELTA 
STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://deltacouncil.ca.gov/events/science-program-workshop/sacramento-water
-allocation-model-sacwam-independent-peer-review [https://perma.cc/HC3H-MQ77]. 
 4. For a description of “optimization models” for non-experts, see 1 KATTA G. MURTY, 
OPTIMIZATION MODELS FOR DECISION-MAKING: JUNIOR LEVEL 9–13 (2003), http://www-personal.
umich.edu/~murty/books/opti_model/ [https://perma.cc/4TMY-TL8E]. 
 5. See discussion infra Part III. 
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tools have flaws, which may prevent successful integration into planning, if not 
addressed. 
Throughout this article, I rely on two optimization models as examples—
CALVIN (CALifornia Value Integration Network) and INFORM (Integrated 
Forecast-Management System)—to explain the ways in which legal context is 
ignored, replaced, and in some cases included. These models were chosen because 
over the past decade their research and development has been funded in large part 
by the state of California as potential decision-support tools for adapting 
California’s water and energy systems to climate change. And they have been 
highlighted in prior California Climate Assessments.6 
A main theme of this article is the ways in which “value” is represented in 
models. “Value” is a notoriously tricky concept to pin down, and deserves some 
upfront explanation to avoid confusion. There are at least three different faces of 
value; and value shows each in different contexts. In sociology, ethics, and 
common speech, value can convey something like “dearly held beliefs” or guiding 
principles.7 In economics, there are other faces. “Use value” is one of these; 
roughly speaking, it is the relative importance of a thing in use8—i.e., the “use 
value” of water tends to be high, while the use value of diamonds is low. Value can 
also indicate “exchange value,” otherwise known as price9—high for diamonds, 
low for water. Exchange value and use value depend on an individual or group’s 
guiding principles (ethical, ideological, or social values). Optimization models 
depend on calculating exchange value, whereas law is largely concerned with 
reflecting the ethics face of value.10 
For purposes of this article, I intend “value” to be read in an inclusive 
way. For example, if hydroelectricity is curtailed in order to protect aquatic habitat, 
that curtailment can be read as an expression of guiding principles—e.g., 
environmental protection, among others. Likewise, if hydroelectric generation is 
curtailed and water is redirected to, say, irrigation because it is not profitable to 
 
 6. Christina R Connel-Buck et al., Adapting Climate’s Water System to Warm vs. Dry Climates, in 
SECOND CALIFORNIA CLIMATE SCENARIOS ASSESSMENT 133–39 (Daniel R. Cayan et al. eds., 2013); 
see also CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE CTR., OUR CHANGING CLIMATE 2012: VULNERABILITY & ADAPATION 
TO THE INCREASING RISKS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA 6 (2012), http://www.energy.ca.gov
/2012publications/CEC-500-2012-007/CEC-500-2012-007.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZET-59EP]. 
 7. Jürgen Habermas defines value as “intersubjectively shared preferences” distinct from norms, 
“[s]hared values express the preferability of goods that, in specific collectivities, are considered worth 
striving for and can be acquired or realized through goal-directed action.” JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 255 (William Rehg trans., 1996). For discussions of non-economic values 
of water, see generally Helen Ingram, Water as a Multi-dimensional Value: Implications for 
Participation and Transparency, 6 INT’L. ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 429, 429–33 (2006). 
 8. JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 11 (1924). 
 9. William M. Hanemann, The Economic Conception of Water, in WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR 
REALITY? 62 (Peter P. Rogers et al. eds., 2006) (“[E]conomic value is different than price. Price does 
not in general measure economic value, and items with no market price can still have a positive 
economic value.”). 
 10. “[M]odern law lives off a solidarity concentrated in the value orientations of citizens and 
ultimately issuing from communicative action and deliberation. . . . [T]he jointly exercised 
communicative freedom of citizens can assume a form that is mediated in a variety of ways by legal 
institutions and procedures, but it cannot be completely replaced by coercive law.” HABERMAS, supra 
note 7, at 33. 
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produce electricity at a given time, that is another expression of value. What I argue 
in this article is that because the larger context of value is missing, modelers of 
hydropower systems incorrectly assign weights to variables to indicate their 
relative importance in optimization models. 
This article begins with a very brief description of the institutional 
economic framework that I use to examine optimization models. With that 
background, the article turns to some key components: what hydropower 
governance in California looks like (Part II), how the state has invested and 
encouraged the development of optimization models to support hydropower 
governance (Part III), and how those models rely on replacements (rather than 
simplifications) of institutional arrangements in order to perform (Part IV). Part V 
applies lessons from institutional economics to optimization models. I conclude 
with suggestions for research to facilitate a path forward for better integration 
between the two opposing worldviews that may lead to acceptable and 
implementable results from models aimed at facilitating climate adaptation. 
I. BACKGROUND ON INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
The problem of how hydropower systems are represented in optimization 
models is closely analogous to the problems with the application of neoclassical 
economics to explain or solve conflicts where multiple (non-price) values are at 
issue. Institutional economics lends a critical outlook to the values considered and 
projected by the neoclassical approach; it can therefore be applied to decision-
support tools like optimization models of hydropower systems. 
Institutional arrangements are essential for an accurate understanding of 
resource allocation and conflicts.11 These arrangements are “working rules for 
going concerns”;12 in other words, the formal and informal rules, created through 
collective action, which form the structure for defining sets of possible options.13 
Sources of formal rules are courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies.14 
 
 11. See Daniel W. Bromley, Land and Water Problems: An Institutional Perspective, 64 AM. J. 
AGRIC. ECON. 834 (1982) [hereinafter Bromley, Land and Water Problems]; Daniel W. Bromley, 
Resources and Economic Development: An Institutionalist Perspective, 19 J. ECON. ISSUES 779, 780 
(1985) [hereinafter Bromley, Resources and Economic Development] (citing JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 780 (1924)); Philip R. Wandschneider, Neoclassical and Institutionalist 
Explanations of Changes in Northwest Water Institutions, 20 J. OF ECON. ISSUES 87 (1986); Federico 
Aguilera-Klink & Juan Sanchez-García, Water Markets in Tenerife: The Conflict Between Instrumental 
and Ceremonial Functions of the Institutions, 3 INT’L J. OF WATER 166 (2005); Carl J. Bauer, Bringing 
Water Markets Down to Earth: The Political Economy of Water Rights in Chile, 1976-95, 25 WORLD 
DEV. 639 (1997) [hereinafter Bauer, Bringing Water Markets Down to Earth]; Carl J. Bauer, Slippery 
Property Rights: Multiple Water Uses and the Neoliberal Model in Chile, 1981-1995, 38 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 109, 109–155 (1998) [hereinafter Bauer, Slippery Property Rights]; CARL J. BAUER, 
SIREN SONG: CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL REFORM (2004) [hereinafter 
BAUER, SIREN SONG]; Carl J. Bauer, Dams and Markets: Rivers and Electric Power in Chile, 49 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 583 (2009) [hereinafter Bauer, Dams and Markets]. 
 12. See Bromley, Resources and Economic Development, supra note 11, at 781–82 (citing JOHN R. 
COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1961)). 
 13. Bromley, Resources and Economic Development, supra note 11, at 783. See generally JOHN R. 
COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 11 (1924). Other similar definitions are offered by 
institutional economist Ciriacy-Wantrup: a “social decision system that provides decision rules for 
adjusting and accommodating, over time, conflicting demands . . . from different interest groups in a 
334 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 57 
Institutions cannot be divorced from history.15 Law does not just happen. 
It comes from processes of conflict, deliberation, and resolution. These processes 
build on past experience and are historical by nature.16 Wandschneider, in his 1986 
study of changes to water rights in the Pacific Northwest, found that social goals, 
rather than price or scarcity, defined options to change or maintain the rights of 
fisheries. Existing power relations constituted an initial distribution that 
conditioned what outcomes were possible. He noted the process for changing water 
rights was dynamic and full of conflict. Bauer’s studies of Chilean water rights 
likewise emphasize the importance of the specific history leading up to Chile’s 
 
society.” See S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Natural Resources in Economic Growth: the Role of Institutions 
and Policies, 51 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1314, 1319 (1969) (alteration in original); see also Aguilera-
Klink & Sanchez-Garcia, supra note 11, at 169 (using a similar definition); Bromley, Land and Water 
Problems, supra note 11, at 839 (“Institutions are collective conventions and rules that establish 
acceptable standards of individual and group behavior.”); Wandschneider, supra note 11, at 93 
(“Institutions define the opportunity set within which choice is made, but individual choice, aggregated 
into collective action, creates the institutional structure.”). 
 14. More specifically, referencing the writings of Commons, Bromley says that capitalism depends 
on courts and legislatures to create value, while socialism depends on administrative rules for the same. 
See Bromley, Resources and Economic Development, supra note 11, at 782. Commons’ writing though 
predated the expansion of administrative agencies and regulation in the United States that define 
operational rules for natural resources. 
 15. See, e.g., NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM 
POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM AND BEYOND 112 (2d ed., 2006). This insight is not unique to 
institutional economics. Within law, the long branch of scholarship stemming from legal realists and 
American Pragmatism has described law as a project of history. See WOUTER DE BEEN, LEGAL 
REALISM REGAINED: SAVING REALISM FROM CRITICAL ACCLAIM 31–74 (2008) (discussing the 
relationship between legal realism and legal history and the differences between critical approaches and 
realist approaches to history); see also Louis Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L REV. 467 (1916) 
(“[N]o law, written or unwritten, can be understood without a full knowledge of the facts out of which it 
arises, and to which it is to be applied.”). 
  Sociologists, historians, and political economists, among others, have noted the same. See 
Bryan Randolph Bruns & Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Frameworks for Water Rights: An Overview of 
Institutional Options, in WATER RIGHTS REFORM: LESSONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 16 (2005) 
(“Many new moves to ‘establish’ water rights act as if there was a blank slate, in which the state holds 
all water rights and can unilaterally allocate those rights as it wishes. But in almost all cases where water 
has been in use, existing institutions constitute a system of implicit water rights, based on the ways 
water is currently being withdrawn, and steps taken or not taken to control withdrawals, particularly 
during periods of shortage.”); RICHARD WHITE, THE ORGANIC MACHINE: THE REMAKING OF THE 
COLUMBIA RIVER (1995) (connecting environmental history to human history and development of law 
and bureaucracy on the Columbia River); Karen Bakker, From State to Market? Water Mercantilización 
in Spain, 34 ENV’T. & PLAN. 767 (2002) (putting Spanish mercantilización of water into political 
economic context, Bakker suggests that commercialization and privatization of water (mercantilization) 
in Spain was a response to Spanish history, and both politically and financially expedient, as the old 
hydraulic regime was politically contentious post-Franco). 
 16. See, e.g, Wandschneider, supra note 11, at 93 (“Institutional change is cumulative in that 
feasible alternatives reflect current rules, knowledge, technology, capital stocks and preferences 
(especially of the powerful), which in turn are all the outcome of previous states and so on. The 
historical process is not reversible.”) 
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1980 Constitution in setting up the rules for Chile’s water market system,17 and its 
associated problems with conflict resolution and equity.18 
At any point within the stream of evolving law, institutional arrangements 
determine value.19 How does the relationship between law and value work? Law 
determines the initial distribution of allocations, or the starting positions for 
bargaining and exchange, thereby giving certain parties the power to influence the 
process and outcomes of defining values of the goods or rights involved in the 
transaction.20 Another way that law determines value is through rules for exchange. 
Law determines who can participate in transactions, under what conditions, and 
with what recourse in case of conflict. These parameters influence how easy it is 
engage in transactions and the strength of property rights. These types of 
parameters can be substantive duties—e.g., prohibitions on “take” of endangered 
species, or the maximum acceptable reservoir level for flood control—as well as 
procedural requirements, for example, the rules defining the appeals process for re-
licensing hydropower dams. 
II. LAW AND GEOGRAPHY OF HYDRPOWER IN CALIFORNIA 
Before going into greater detail on how value and law are represented in 
these hydropower system optimization models, it is important to understand some 
of the institutions that govern the systems represented in them. The legal reality of 
California’s water and energy systems is a web of networked jurisdictions of 
multiple federal and state agencies, with varying levels of coordination, long 
periods of legally obligated stability with rigid rules, and prone to conflict, but with 
multiple procedures for conflict resolution. Each thread of the web has its own 
history—reflecting changing values and priorities, as well as changes to the 
political power of different groups. All threads influence one another at points of 
intersection. Hydropower dams are one of these points. 
A. Hydropower Law in California Is Heterogeneous yet Patterned 
There is a noticeable split between federal and state law in the mountains 
of the Sierra Nevada. It works like this: If you are water in late spring snowmelt, 
the first impediment to your flow will be a privately owned dam. If you are a 
salmon swimming upstream from the sea, the first obstacle will be a federally 
owned dam. This is a simplification, but the general rule of thumb is that private 
non-federal dams are located at high elevations, while the larger federal dams are 
 
 17. See generally Bauer, Bringing Water Markets Down to Earth, supra note 11; Bauer, Slippery 
Property Rights, supra note 11, at 111; see generally BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 11; Bauer, Dams 
and Markets, supra note 11, at 584. 
 18. Carl J. Bauer, Water Conflicts and Entrenched Governance Problems in Chile’s Market Model, 
8 WATER ALTERNATIVES 147 (2015). 
 19. The converse can also be true. The people and groups who craft institutional arrangements have 
the opportunity to infuse new institutional arrangements with their values. 
 20. Some members of the U.S. judiciary explicitly rely on this mechanism to help decide disputes 
in a manner that changes the bargaining position of litigants to negotiate further. Cf. Ward Farnswoth, 
Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain after Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 CHI. L. 
REV. 373, 421 (1999) (finding that in a sample of 20 cases, litigants rarely bargained after specific relief 
was granted, even if bargaining would be mutually beneficial). 
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located downstream at lower elevations. This division has implications for rivers, 
electricity generation, and water supply because the laws governing non-federal 
and federal dams are so different. And each set of rules has its corresponding 
barriers and opportunities for adaptation. 
On the western slopes of the Sierra Nevada, from an elevation of 1,000 
feet to the peaks of the mountains, there are over 150 hydropower dams, providing 
the lion’s share of the state’s hydroelectric generation, though lacking in storage 
capacity.21 Almost none of these are federal dams. They are dominated by mid-
sized dams, whose installed capacity ranges in tens rather than hundreds of 
megawatts. And they are owned and operated primarily by private utilities and 
independent private operators, along with a handful of publicly owned utilities. 
Altogether, high-elevation dams account for most of the generating capacity in 
California (approximately 74 percent).22 
At lower elevations, and in the Cascades range in the far north of the state 
of California, federal hydropower dams control the bulk of generation capacity and 
water storage. These dams were built primarily with water delivery, flood control, 
and agriculture in mind, with hydroelectric generation as a secondary purpose.23 
No hydropower dam in California is governed only by federal law. Nor is 
one governed only by state law. Instead each dam is governed by interconnected 
federal and state water law, environmental law, and energy law. Although the 
federal government has always played a strong role in hydropower governance in 
California24 through its powers to regulate commerce on navigable rivers of the 
United States, its preemption of state hydroelectric law through the Federal Power 
Act, and its role as owner of the largest dams in the state, the state is a steward of 
the public trust in rivers, responsible for water quality, and the determination, 
allocation, and governance of water rights. 
 
 21. ASPEN ENVTL GROUP & M-CUBED, POTENTIAL CHANGES IN HYDROPOWER PRODUCTION FROM 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA AND THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 3, 7 (2005), 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-700-2005-010/CEC-700-2005-010.PDF [https://
perma.cc/E5U2-PARS] (drafted in support of the 2005 Integrated Energy Policy Report Proceeding). 
 22. MARION GUEGAN, KAVEH MADANI, & CINTIA B. UVO, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CLIMATE 
CHANGE EFFECTS ON THE HIGH-ELEVATION HYDROPOWER SYSTEM WITH CONSIDERATION OF 
WARMING IMPACTS ON ELECTRICITY DEMAND AND PRICING 3 (2012). 
 23. Maurice Roos, a hydropower expert  at the California Department of Water Resources, recalled 
that a lower elevation hydropower dam was built with a wide and shallow pool in order to supply water 
at more ideal (warmer) temperatures for rice growers in the Sacramento area. Interview by Sonya Ziaja 
with Maurice Roos, California Department of Water Resources, May 4, 2015, Sacramento, CA (on file 
with author). 
  For more background on large federal dams, see DAVID P. BILLINGTON, DONALD C. JACKSON, 
& MARTIN V. MELOSI, THE HISTORY OF LARGE FEDERAL DAMS: PLANNING, DESIGN, AND 
CONSTRUCTION IN THE ERA OF BIG DAMS (2005). 
 24. The federal government though has not always exercised its power over hydropower in the 
West, and at times has doubted its existence. See MARTIN MELOSI, COPING WITH ABUNDANCE: ENERGY 
AND ENVIRONMENT IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1985). Disputes over the ability and legitimacy of the 
federal government to regulate the operations of hydroelectric dams have been a major part of 
hydropower history since private dams were first developed in the late 19th century. 
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B. How are Federal and Non-federal Dams Governed? 
Federal hydropower dams each have operating rules that are the product 
of federal and state interagency cooperation and authorization by the U.S. 
Congress. The hydroelectric dam at Shasta, for example, was originally a state 
project; but due to lack of funds during the Great Depression, the design was 
transferred to federal ownership—i.e., the federal government ended up paying for, 
building, and maintaining the state-planned dam. The United States Bureau of 
Reclamation (Bureau of Reclamation) continues to be responsible for Shasta’s 
operation. Reclamation does not act alone, though. Nor does it have the final say in 
operations. Like all other large federal dams in the state, Shasta is a multipurpose 
dam. It was designed for flood control, irrigation, water storage, and hydroelectric 
power supply. Flood control rules are set for all federal dams by the Army Corps of 
Engineers.25 California Department of Water Resources is responsible for 
coordinating irrigation diversions and hydrologic forecasting.26 California 
Department of Fish and Wildlife coordinates with Reclamation to decide on 
appropriate releases of water from the dam.27 And finally, the National Weather 
Service, although not directly involved in the operation of the dam, provides 
hydrologic forecasts, which are key inputs for reservoir operations decision-
making.28 Electricity pricing from Shasta is, in part, governed by an agreement29 
between the Western Area Power Administration (part of the U.S. Department of 
Energy)30 and the California Independent System Operator Corporation (a heavily 
regulated nonprofit, responsible for balancing most of California’s electricity 
grid).31 
Although water governance is generally left to the states in the U.S., 
hydropower law for non-federal dams is an exception.32 Non-federal hydropower 
 
 25. See Water Control Management, 33 C.F.R. § 222.5(f)(1) (2017). See also Flood Control Act of 
1944, Pub. L. 78, 58 Stat. 890, 33 U.S.C. 709 (2012). 
 26. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 225–238 (West 2017). 
 27. Letter from Kirk C. Rodgers, Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Reclamation, Dep’t of the Interior, to Lester 
Snow, Dir., Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. (Feb. 10, 2006) (referring to Principles of Agreement For 
Collocation of California Department of Water Resources State Water Project Operations Control Office 
and United States Bureau of Reclamation Central Valley Operations Office), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/
cvo/data/Principles%20of%20Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/XRH5-BW9H]. 
 28. Harry R. Glahn & David P. Ruth, The New Digital Forecast Database of the National Weather 
Service, 84 BULL. OF THE AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 195 (2003). 
 29. Press Release, Jennifer Neville, California ISO, Western Agree Upon Locational Pricing for 
CVP Federal Hydropower, Increasing Value of Hydropower Stock in California, Western Area Power 
Administration (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.wapa.gov/newsroom/NewsFeatures/2015/Pages/CVP-
hyropower-increased-value.aspx [https://perma.cc/VL6G-8C4F]. 
 30. See About WAPA, WESTERN AREA POWER ADMIN., https://www.wapa.gov/About/Pages/
About.aspx [https://perma.cc/4VJD-ENYU]. 
 31. See About Us, CAL. ISO, http://www.caiso.com/about/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/
U23U-4CXB]; Ziad Alaywan & Jack Allen, California Electric Restructuring: a Broad Description of 
the Development of the California ISO, 13 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS 1445 (1998). 
 32. See Reed Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority under 
Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241 (2006) (challenging the widely held 
misconception that the federal government has always deferred to states for water governance, and 
relying in part on the Federal Power Act as an example of “low deference” to states for water 
management). 
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dams—which include state owned dams, municipal, and privately owned dams—
are nearly all regulated through a federal licensing process that determines the 
operating rules of the dam for a period of 30–50 years.33 The Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC),34 under the Federal Power Act (FPA), has 
primary responsibility for developing, granting or denying, and renewing these 
licenses.35 Consideration of uses other than hydroelectric generation is built into the 
FPA and other authorizing statutes applicable to non-federal hydropower—
bringing state and federal interagency cooperation with it.36 Under the FPA, issued 
licenses must be “best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or 
developing a waterway,”37 and ultimately be in the public interest.38 1986 
amendments to the FPA expand on this requirement, mandating “equal 
consideration” of energy, environment, recreation, and public health.39 If the dam is 
on federal land, the agency that manages the land can impose conditions on 
licenses to maintain the purpose of the land (protection/use).40 Additionally, if a 
dam is located on federal land, under the 2005 amendments to the FPA,41 parties to 
pending licenses can propose alternative conditions that FERC must accept if they 
 
 33. 16 U.S.C § 808(e) (2012). 
 34. The FPA is the successor to the Federal Power Commission. See Federal Water Power Act, ch. 
285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 791a (2012)). See also Department of 
Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, 582–87 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7171–77 (2012)). 
 35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 792, 797 (2012). 
 36. 2 ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS § 53.02 (Michael A. Swiger et al. eds., 2016). 
 37. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a). 
 38. Udall v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 387 U.S. 428, 440 (1976). 
 39. Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2012)) (stating that FERC “shall give equal consideration to the 
purposes of energy conservation, the protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and 
wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat), the protection of recreational opportunities, 
and the preservation of other aspects of environmental quality”). See also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 80 F.2d 1505, 1507, 1513 (9th Cir. 1986) (interpreting the Federal Power 
Act, equal consideration does not mean equal treatment). 
  For an exploration of FERC’s reluctance after the passage of the EPCA to take on its 
“secondary mission” of environmental protection, and an assessment of interagency lobbying among 
federal wildlife and environmental agencies and FERC, see J.R, DeShazo and Jody Freeman, Public 
Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2223 (2005) (also noting that “[t]hough ECPA made 
this requirement[, i.e., equal consideration to non power values in licensing decisions,] explicit, FERC 
was arguably bound to such equal consideration already, at least under the FPA as it had been construed 
by the courts, . . . Yet FERC had, for a variety of reasons, long resisted doing so.”) (internal citations 
omitted). See Ann E. Carlson & Andrew Mayer, Reverse Preemption, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 583, 593 
(2013) (discussing FERC’s expanded environmental mission under the 1986 amendments and the 
important role of state intervention in FERC decision-making to hold it to new environmental 
requirements); see also Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and 
the Rise of Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Relicensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81, 88 (2001) 
(discussing FERC’s failure to respond to its environmental duties, especially under the EPCA); George 
W. Sherk, Approaching a Gordian Knot: The Ongoing State/Federal Conflict Over Hydropower, 31 
LAND & WATER L. REV. 350, 356 (1996) (discussing FERC’s approach to consultation and 
consideration requirements). 
 40. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2012). 
 41. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58. 119 Stat. 594. 
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provide “adequate” protection and cost less or improve operating conditions.42 
Regardless of the location of the dam, the federal fisheries agencies (U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service) can impose terms in 
licenses for the construction and operation of fish passageways.43 Since 2005, 
parties can propose alternative conditions for fisheries mitigation and protection 
that FERC must accept if they offer “equivalent” protection and cost less or 
improve energy output.44 Federal and state fish and wildlife agencies are also 
empowered to propose conditions “in order to adequately and equitably protect, 
mitigate damages to, and enhance, fish and wildlife [and associated habitat].”45 
The FPA also includes a “savings clause”—modeled after that of the 1902 
Reclamation Act—that reserves the right of the states to regulate water.46 Although 
historically, judicial interpretation of the two clauses required more deference from 
Reclamation than from FERC to state law and policy,47 the Clean Water Act 
provides another opening for state input and control over water quality 
 
 42. 16 U.S.C. § 823(d) (2012). 
 43. 16 U.S.C. § 811 (2012). 
 44. 16 U.S.C. § 823(d). Third parties can also demand quasi judicial hearing on any disputed issue 
of material fact. See 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2012). For an analysis of the implementation of hearings and 
stakeholder views of the collaborative aspects of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, see generally U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HYDROPOWER RELICENSING: STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEWS ON THE 
ENERGY POLICY ACT VARIED, BUT MORE CONSISTENT INFORMATION NEEDED (2010), http://www.gao.
gov/products/GAO-10-770 [https://perma.cc/DSA4-P9RS]. 
 45. 16 U.S.C. § 803(j)(1) (2012). FERC however only needs to consider and respond in writing to 
suggestions. See 16 U.S.C. § 803(j)(2). See supra note 39 and accompanying text for citations 
discussing the interplay between environmental agencies and FERC. For more on the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005, see generally Michael D. Hornstein & J.S. Gebhart Stoermer, The Energy Policy Act of 2005: 
PURPA Reform, the Amendments and their Implications, 27 ENERGY L.J. 25 (2006). 
 46. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (2012) (stating that states have authority to regulate “relating to control, 
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any 
vested right acquired therein”). And see Fed. Power Comm’n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955), for early 
treatment of federal preemption. For histories of caselaw dealing with federal versus state jurisdiction 
over water for hydroelectric power, see generally Daniel Pollak, Note, S.D. Warren and the Erosion of 
Federal Preeminence in Hydropower Regulation, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 763 (2007); see also Roderick E. 
Walston, State Regulation of Federally-Licensed Hydropower Projects: The Conflict between California 
and First Iowa, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 87 (1990) [hereinafter Walston, State Regulation of Federally-
Licensed Hydropower Projects] (Walston, who represented California in lawsuits against FERC, argues 
that the line of cases stemming from First Iowa were wrongly decided); Roderick E. Walston, 
California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: New Roadblock to State Water Rights 
Administration, 21 ENVTL. L. 89 (1991) [hereinafter Walston, California v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission]; M. Curtis Whittaker, The Federal Power Act and Hydropower Development: 
Rediscovering State Regulatory Powers and Responsibilities, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 135 (1986) 
(arguing that states have “a latent authority” over small hydropower development). 
 47. California v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 495 U.S. 490, 503–05 (1990) (referred to as the 
Rock Creek Decision, rejecting California’s argument that the FPA savings clause required the same 
deference to state water law as the Reclamation savings clause); see also Sayles Hydro Ass’n v. 
Maughan, 985 F.2d 451 (1993) (emphasizing the Rock Creek decision and holding that the only 
permissible state regulation that could be imposed on federally licensed dams was to determine 
proprietary water rights). For strong critiques of the Rock Creek Decision, see Walston, State 
Regulation of Federally-Licensed Hydropower Projects, supra note 46 (addressing the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision); see also Walston, California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, supra note 46 
(addressing the Supreme Court decision); A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES 
§ 9:20 (2016). 
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considerations in FERC licensing. Specifically, Section 401 of the Clean Water Act 
allows states to impose conditions on FERC licenses so that state water quality 
standards are met.48 Case law interpreting the application of Section 401 to FERC 
licenses has gradually expanded the powers of states (as against the federal energy 
agency) to regulate water quality for environmental and aesthetic goals.49 
What is notable about how state and federal law interact for both federal 
and non-federal dams is that the law that governs hydropower operations in 
California is not uniform—no set of rules for a hydropower generating station is 
exactly the same set of rules for any other hydropower generation station. There is 
overlapping jurisdiction across multiple federal and state agencies. Which rules 
apply depend on where a dam is located, how large it is, what entity owns the dam, 
what purposes it was built for, and the particulars of the ecosystem where it is 
situated.50 The idea that the rules for each dam are “to at least some extent . . . 
unique” is reflected in FERC’s policy statement encouraging settlement agreements 
for licensing and issues outside of FERC’s direct jurisdiction: 
Hydroelectric Licensing proceedings under Part I of the Federal 
Power Act (FPA) are multi-faceted and complex. These 
proceedings involve the balancing of many public interest 
factors, as well as consideration of the views of all interested 
groups and individuals. Moreover, since the physical design, 
environmental impact, and history of every project is different, 
each licensing proceeding is, to at least some extent, unique.51 
In short, while there are similarities across dams, the particular 
combination of operating rules for each, the means to change those rules, and the 
set of stakeholders and concerns for each, are all different. 
C. Distribution of Barriers to Climate Adaptation Vary by Geography 
A consequence of multijurisdictional hydropower governance is that the 
resulting distribution of barriers and opportunities for adaptation to climate change 
impacts vary by geography. For example, higher elevation dams, and the stretches 
of river that flow to and from them, are more likely to be susceptible to the 
 
 48. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2012). 
 49. PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 722–23 (1994) (FERC must accept 401 
conditions including those related to fish protection and aesthetic goals). See Pollak, supra note 46 
(discussing SD Warren); see also Carlson & Mayer, supra note 39, at 586–87 (arguing that “reverse 
preemption”, or power of states to check federal agencies through CWA § 401, “may guard against . . . 
the power of specialized agencies like the Federal Regulatory Commission . . . , the Department of the 
Interior . . . , and the Army Corps of Engineers. These agencies may develop institutional cultures that 
favor particular interest groups with which they have frequent contact. The reverse preemption 
provisions ensure that the voices of states with strong environmental concerns are heard.”). 
 50. Further operational rules—for example deploying small hydrogeneration to repower from a 
“black start”—depend on electricity demand and supply, as coordinated through Balancing Authorities. 
See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET 
BASICS (2015), https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/S87A-
BT4E]. 
 51. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, NO. PL06-5-000, POLICY STATEMENT ON HYDROPOWER 
LICENSING SETTLEMENTS (2006). 
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challenges posed by state law and FERC, while lower elevation federal dams and 
stretches of river are dominated by constraints from Army Corps rules regarding 
flood control. 
While there are multiple theories and definitions of climate adaptation and 
adaptive governance, for purposes of this paper, I will employ the definition of 
climate adaptation used by the California Energy Commission (CEC), since it has 
been a major funding agency of engineering models of the hydropower system and 
of climate adaptation-related research. The Energy Commission is part of an 
interagency Energy Adaptation Working Group that also includes representatives 
from the California Public Utilities Commission, California Natural Resources 
Agency, and the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. The group defines 
climate adaptation for the energy sector as: “Planning and implementation to 
provide reliable and accessible energy in California, accounting for current and 
projected effects of climate change, and including iterative learning mechanisms to 
refine efforts as climatic conditions and scientific knowledge evolve.”52 A joint 
Energy Commission and CPUC public workshop held in June 2016 on climate 
adaptation for the energy sector focused on lessons from current real-world 
attempts to alter energy systems and plan for climate change.53 Two aspects of 
adaptation to climate change were common throughout the presentations. One of 
these was the need for flexibility in decision-making. The second was the need to 
consider interconnections across sectors and geography.54 I will focus on these two 
elements of adaptation—flexibility and cross-sector considerations—to help 
describe the potential legal barriers to climate adaptation in California hydropower. 
1. Lack of Flexibility and Coordination in FERC Licensing 
FERC relicensing has several attributes that make it ill-suited to flexible 
decision-making and interconnected considerations. A major barrier to flexibility is 
the duration of the licenses. 
The FPA requires FERC operating licenses be issued for a minimum of 30 
and a maximum of 50 years.55 It is possible that the time period for relicensing—
really a period of non-interference—was set at 50 years because that was the 
anticipated time for the licensee to have recovered its initial investment.56 It also 
allows for an entire generation of managers and operators to work under the same 
set of rules without, in theory, needing to anticipate change. The origins of the 50 
 
 52. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2016 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT UPDATE 117–18 (2017), 
http://docketpublic.energy.ca.gov/PublicDocuments/16-IEPR-01/TN216281_20170228T131538_Final_ 
2016_Integrated_Energy_Policy_Report_Update_Complete_Repo.pdf [https://perma.cc/EKM2-EHJC] 
[hereinafter CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2016 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT UPDATE]. 
 53. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, JOINT IEPR WORKSHOP ON CLIMATE ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCY 
FOR THE ENERY SECTOR (2016), http://docketpublic.energy.ca.gov/PublicDocuments/16-IEPR-04/TN21
2477_20160727T135220_Transcript_of_the_06212016_Joint_IEPR_Workshop_on_Climate_Adapt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F67W-HTJC]. 
 54. See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2016 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT UPDATE, supra note 
52, at 23, 29–30, 42–43, 59, 67. 
 55. 16 U.S.C § 808 (2012). 
 56. See Whittaker, supra note 46, 147–50 (discussing the early history of the FPA and President 
Roosevelt’s insistence that permits “be subject to the right of the Government to fix a term for their 
duration”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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year permit, though, has its roots in early twentieth century debates over whether 
the federal government should, or even did, have jurisdiction to regulate 
hydropower dams. In the late nineteenth century, hydroelectric power was private. 
As part of a lengthy debate over the validity of public regulation of private 
hydroelectric power in the first two decades of the twentieth century, the U.S. 
Forest Service, and later the U.S. Geologic Survey, became responsible for issuing 
“right of way” permits that allowed private dams to be built and operated on federal 
land.57 Private power companies lobbied against the permit system and for 
“perpetual leases.”58 Although they were ultimately unsuccessful, the permit 
program eventually was amended to allow 50-year grants.59 Congress did not adjust 
the 50-year minimum until Regan-era amendments to the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act (PURPA)60 and the FPA shortened it to 30 years for most projects. 
The irony of having a lengthy period of relative legal stability is that while 
the rules remain the same for that period, the climatic conditions will not. In a 
sense, the basic idea of FERC relicensing—alternating periods of stability with 
comprehensive review for relicensing—is harmonious with theories of adaptive 
governance.61 But the timescale is too long. For example, over a period of 30–50 
years,62 downscaled climate models for Sacramento show an annual mean 
temperature increase of approximately 4.5 degrees Fahrenheit, with nearly five 
times the number of extreme heat days (above 103.9 degrees Fahrenheit).63 These 
temperature changes have a significant impact on demand for energy, availability 
of water, timing and type of precipitation, as well as changing critical habitat 
conditions.64 Put another way, climate change is altering the hydrology of 
California65 faster than FERC dams are being relicensed. 
 
 57. MELOSI, supra note 24, at 81. 
 58. Id. Lobbying and procedural maneuvering in the U.S. House of Representatives almost resulted 
in such perpetual and non-conditional leases for seventeen private hydropower projects, had it not been 
for President Taft vetoing similar legislation. See 2 ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS § 53.02 (2017). 
 59. MELOSI, supra note 24, at 82. 
 60. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978). 
 61. See Robin K. Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 
VANDERBILT L. REV. 1, 3–16 (2014). 
 62. Beginning in 2005, with an annual mean temperature derived from observed data from 1950–
2005, and with projections aligned with RCP 8.5. The annual mean described above is an average of ten 
climate models, selected by the California Department of Water Resources. See Annual Averages, CAL-
ADAPT, http://beta.cal-adapt.org/tools/annual-averages/#climatevar=tasmax&scenario=rcp85&lat=38.58
&lng=-121.46&boundary=locaModelGrid&units=fahrenheit (last visited Apr. 27, 2017). 
 63. See Extreme Heat, CAL-Adapt, http://beta.cal-adapt.org/tools/extreme-heat/#climatevar=tasmax
&scenario=rcp45&lat=38.58&lng=-121.46&boundary=locaModelGrid&units=fahrenheit (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2017) (using RCP 8.5). 
 64. See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2015 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT 241–44 (2016). 
 65. Climate change is decreasing the Sierra snowpack that feeds the state’s major rivers in the 
spring and summer, increasing evapotranspiration from warmer temperatures, and affecting atmospheric 
rivers. See generally Michael Dettinger, Bradley Udall & Aris Georgakakos, Western Water and 
Climate Change, 25 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2069 (2015); see also CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2015 
INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT (2016). For detailed atmospheric river and climate change 
studies, see generally David A. Lavers et al., Climate Change Intensification of Horizontal Water Vapor 
Transport in CMIP5, 42 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 5617 (2015); Michael D. Dettinger, Historical 
and Future Relations Between Large Storms and Droughts in California, 14 S.F. ESTUARY & 
WATERSHED SCI. 1 (2016). 
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Additionally, most FERC-licensed dams were initially licensed prior to 
the 1970s, and operating under rules written prior to the passage of the Endangered 
Species Act (1973), the Clean Water Act (1972), the National Environmental 
Protection Act (1970), and their procedurally-demanding state law analogs (the 
California Endangered Species Act, or CESA, and the California Environmental 
Quality Act, or CEQA, both passed in 1970). 
There are two mechanisms that in theory allow the licenses to be more 
flexible tools. The FPA and FERC regulation allows for the inclusion of “reopener 
clauses” in licenses, which allow terms to be renegotiated during the 30–50 year 
term.66 And, licensees can request that multiple dams be considered at once, such 
that licensing is coordinated at a basin-wide scale rather than on a case-by-case 
basis. In practice though, it has been left to the discretion of the licensees to request 
that these terms be included; and licensees have largely not opted to take on the 
extra challenge of coordinating across dam owners or including reopener clauses. 
Similarly, even where the rules offer FERC discretion to consider climate 
change, the agency has been reluctant to do so. Viers, for example, describes how a 
group of stakeholders used the formal process for petitioning the agency to 
consider additional scientific information in the relicensing of Yuba-Bear Drum-
Spaulding hydroelectric facilities.67 This was the Integrated Licensing Process 
(ILP). ILP is a very recent addition to the FERC licensing process that was added 
through the 2005 Energy Policy Act Section 241. FERC rejected the request, 
stating that climate change models have insufficient accuracy to inform license 
conditions. 
As a result, the status quo for most FERC licenses is to only consider 
impacts to the river immediately where the dam is located, and not upstream or 
cumulative downstream impacts. Since most high-elevation dams are FERC 
licensed dams, the long-lasting rules in licensing come with miles of downstream 
river to absorb their consequences. 
2. Inflexible Planning for Multiple Objectives in Army Corps Flood 
Control Rule Curves 
There are strict guidelines developed by the Army Corps of Engineers for 
each federal dam designed for flood control68 that proscribes the maximum amount 
of water allowable at a given dam, based on the date. From an adaptation 
standpoint there are three things that are important about rule curves. First, they do 
not offer much, if any, room for variation or discretion. Some rule curves are more 
 
 66. See Pollak, supra note 46, at 766, 784. Reopener clauses have also been supported by Congress. 
“The Committee believes that the Commission should have authority to ensure that licenses reflect 
current information concerning the need to protect fish and wildlife. The legislation does not change 
existing law, including case law, governing FERC authority to modify licenses during their term.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 99-507, at 32 (1986). 
 67. See generally Josh Viers, Hydropower Relicensing and Climate Change, 47 J. AM. WATER 
RESOURCES ASS’N 655 (2011). 
 68. Army Corps rule curves also can apply to non-federal dams where the federal government 
provides partial financial support (i.e., non-federal dams with federal cost share like Oroville) and can 
be incorporated into FERC licenses where applicable. See, e.g., Oroville-Federal Flood Control 
Operating Criteria, DEPT. WATER RES., http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/facilities/Oroville/FCRules.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/SC8Z-U35G] (text taken from California Water Plan Update Bulletin 160-98). 
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flexible than others. The conditions considered in rule curves are different from 
dam to dam. Shasta’s includes greater flexibility for refill (i.e, can begin refill 
earlier in the year), and ties the rate of refill to observed inflows, for example. 
However, New Bullards Bar’s rule curve is static and anticipates hypothetical flows 
from another dam (Marysville), which was never constructed.69 But what is 
consistent across Army Corps rule curves is that they do not take short- and 
medium-term forecasts into account.70 Second, rule curves are based on historical 
data. For example, the curve for New Bullards Bar Reservoir was based on one 
“wet” year (1954) and one “near normal” year (1952).71 Third, dam operators are 
required to follow the rule curve. In effect, this means that when water supply—
whether for environment, energy, or human consumption—is pitted against flood 
control, flood control wins, even if the likelihood of flood is near zero.72 
Post-1959, when the Army Corps published a master manual on reservoir 
regulation,73 the intent had been to review and update rule curves every three to 
five years.74 However, there was insufficient funding available to cover the costs of 
compliance with NEPA to update rule curves. In the absence of reliable funding, 
the Corps has not regularly updated rule curves.75 
 
 69. See U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, NEW BULLARDS BAR DAM AND RESERVOIR, NORTH YUBA 
RIVER, CALIFORNIA: WATER CONTROL MANUAL (2004); Ann Willis et al., Climate Change and Flood 
Operations in the Sacramento Basin, California, 9 S.F. ESTUARY & WATERSHED SCI. 1, 14 (2011). 
 70. See, e.g., JUAN B. VALDES & JUAN B. MARCO, U.S.-ITALY RESEARCH WORKSHOP ON THE 
HYDROMETEROLOGY, IMPACTS, AND MGMT. OF EXTREME FLOODS, MANAGING RESERVOIRS FOR 
FLOOD CONTROL 1 (1995), http://www.engr.colostate.edu/ce/facultystaff/salas/us-italy/papers/43
valdes.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2VE-7GKB] (discussing the early history of the interest in the 
“application of optimization and forecasting techniques to water resource systems” and the flood control 
techniques for reservoirs used by the US Army Corps of Engineers). 
 71. U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, NEW BULLARDS BAR RESERVOIR, NORTH YUBA RIVER, 
CALIFORNIA: REGULATION FOR FLOOD CONTROL 5–12 (1972) (discussing characteristics of the climate 
in the basin). 
 72. The problem of maladaptive flood control rules is more visible to the public than the long 
duration of static FERC licenses, because the result is releasing water in dry years. The past several 
years of drought have made Californians particularly sensitive to how much water is stored in their 
reservoirs, especially if those reservoirs are releasing water rather than maintaining it for long and dry 
summers. See Ryan Sabalow, Phillip Reese & Dale Kasler, Sacramento Agencies Ask: Why Release 
Water from Folsom Lake During Drought?, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.sacbee.com
/news/state/california/water-and-drought/article60419396.html [https://perma.cc/N7PK-UJSE]; Annie 
Snider, Dusty Federal Rules Complicate Water Management in Parched West, E&E NEWS. (Feb. 27, 
2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059995262 [https://perma.cc/42CM-E67U]; Barbara Arrigoni, 
Biological Opinion Slows Oroville Dam Facilities Relicensing Process, CHICOER NEWS (Oct. 5, 2015), 
http://www.chicoer.com/article/NA/20151005/NEWS/151009847 [https://perma.cc/3HUC-98KK]. 
These popular news stories have delved into the normally wonky world of federal administrative law to 
report on tension between rules for water supply and flood control in dams throughout the state. 
 73. U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, MASTER MANUAL OF RESERVOIR REGULATION: SACRAMENTO 
RIVER BASIN, CALIFORNIA (1959). 
 74. Willis, supra note 69, at 3. 
 75. Id. It should be noted the rule curves for Folsom are currently being reconsidered. See, e.g., 
Sabalow, Reese & Kasler, supra note 72. 
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III. ENGINEERING MODELS ON CHANGING HYDROPOWER 
GOVERNANCE 
“All models are wrong, but some are useful.” 
—George E. P. Box 
Why focus on engineering optimization models, given the state of 
hydropower governance? Over the past decade and a half, there has been a 
proliferation of research tackling barriers to climate adaptation for hydropower 
dams, suggesting alternative ways forward for dam operations76 and illuminating 
the interactions between science-informed decision-making and law for water 
management. Roughly, there are three approaches. The first suggests that the 
prevailing laws governing hydropower are maladaptive and that modeling work is 
key to reforming those laws.77 This group is predominately comprised of engineers 
and environmental scientists.78 The second line of reasoning, dominated by 
lawyers, portrays science, and by extension hydrologic modeling and other tools, as 
captured by disputants in legal battles over water rights.79 And the third approach, 
from multidisciplinary social scientists, suggests that a “culture of conservatism,” 
or general risk aversion, among water managers has prevented them from 
incorporating short-term climate forecasts, but that changes within organizational 
culture may allow for future managers to incorporate climate information into 
hydropower management practices.80 
Critiques based on engineering models are notable because California has 
disproportionately solicited and funded research from these fields on adapting its 
 
 76. This was the topic for a three-day conference on “Operating Reservoirs in Changing 
Conditions” held by the Environmental and Water Resources Institute (EWRI) of the American Society 
of Civil Engineers held in Sacramento, California. It was co-sponsored by the US Army Corps of 
Engineers, Reclamation, California Department of Water Resources, The Northern Colorado Water 
Conservancy District, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. The complete set of 43 studies presented at 
the conference are published in AMERICAN SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 
CONFERENCE: OPERATING RESERVOIRS IN CHANGING CONDITIONS (Darell Zimbelman & Werner C. 
Loehlein eds., 2006). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., K. P. Georgakakos et al., Integrating Climate-Hydrology Forecasts and Multi-
Objective Reservoir Management for Northern California, 86 EOS 122 (2005); JEFFREY MOUNT ET AL., 
REGIONAL AGREEMENTS, ADAPTATION, AND CLIMATE CHANGE: NEW APPROACHES TO FERC 
LICENSING IN THE SIERRA NEVADA, CALIFORNIA (2007), http://watershed.ucdavis.edu/pdf/Mount-et-al-
FERC-081707.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSL3-DNH2]; Viers, supra note 67; Willis, supra note 69. 
 79. See, e.g., HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN: 
MACHO LAW, COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS (2008). 
 80. See generally Steve Rayner, Denise Lach & Helen Ingram, Weather Forecasts are for Wimps: 
Why Water Resources Managers do not Use Climate Forecasts, 69 CLIMATIC CHANGE 197 (2005); 
Denise Lach, Steve Rayner & Helen Ingram, Taming the Waters: Strategies to Domesticate the Wicked 
Problem of Water Resources Management, 3 INTL. J. WATER 1 (2005). These three approaches are not 
necessarily inconsistent, however, as the context and concerns for each group are distinct. Doremus and 
Tarlock were specifically concerned with how science is wielded in ongoing litigation; the engineering 
group is not necessarily advocating any particular use of reservoirs over others; and the social science 
group was concerned about why or why not seasonal climate forecasts were being adopted by water 
managers. In other words, the overarching questions each group is trying to answer is different. 
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water and energy systems,81 and because engineering optimization models offer a 
peculiar set of prescriptions that relate more to their method of diagnosis than the 
underlying illness. 
After modeling the hydropower system, or parts of it, to include more 
“rational” rules, engineering modelers tend to first note how much better the 
system would work if the institutional arrangements in reality were more like those 
in the model, and recommend significant changes to those arrangements without 
regard to existing legal or political context. What is missing in this kind of analysis 
is an understanding of the institutional arrangements for changing the rules that 
govern hydropower dams. If the models were more complete, or at least more 
faithful, in their representation of the institutional structures undergirding 
hydropower systems, it might be difficult to reasonably suggest major changes to 
those rules. 
Curiously, a few engineering, and related environmental science, studies 
do make the point that the barriers to adaptation are, at root, political, and therefore 
may not be easy to overcome or alter. Viers, for example, after challenging FERC 
for its “poor reasoning” and “risky decision” to reject the inclusion of climate 
change considerations in its relicensing of a dam, notes that the agency “is probably 
challenged to meet its regulatory mandate while balancing many political and 
economic interests.”82 Similar observations are made by Mount and others.83 The 
idea that barriers to adaptation stem from “messy” governance is inherent in the use 
of the CALVIN model’s “optimistic representation of what can be done 
institutionally.”84 And an early engineering paper on managing reservoirs for flood 
control using optimization notes that “It appears that legal, socio-economic, and 
construction funding problems place so many constraints on reservoir capacity 
decision that, in practice, hydrologic and purely technological issues remain 
secondary.”85 
However, after pointing out the political, social, and financial problems of 
overcoming the identified barriers, these scholars rarely suggest political, social, or 
financial solutions.86 Rather, they turn to more modeling as a path forward.87 
 
 81. For detailed information on research funding through the California Energy Commission’s 
administration of the PIER grant program, see Research and Development Reports and Publications, 
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/research/reports_pubs.html (last visited April 27, 
2017). 
 82. Viers, supra note 67, at 3, 4. 
 83. MOUNT ET AL., supra note 78, at 5, 13. 
 84. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATIONS FOR LOCAL WATER MANAGEMENT 
IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 1–2 (2005), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2012publications/CEC-500-
2012-036/CEC-500-2012-036.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BDB-KKP8]. 
 85. VALDES & MARCO, supra note 70, at 5–6. 
 86. Cf. Viers, supra note 67. 
 87. See, e.g., MOUNT ET AL., supra note 78; GEORGAKAKOS ET AL., supra note 78; Stacy K. Tanaka 
et al., Climate Warming and Water Management Adaptation for California, 76 CLIMATIC CHANGE 361 
(2006); Josue Medellin-Azuara et al., Adaptability and Adaptations of California’s Water Supply System 
to Dry Warming, 87 CLIMATIC CHANGE 575 (2008); Willis, supra note 69; VALDES & MARCO, supra 
note 70. Cf. William S. Sicke, Jay R. Lund, & Josué Medellín-Azuara, Climate Change Adaptations for 
California’s San Francisco Bay Area Water Supplies, 3 BRIT. J. ENV’T & CLIMATE CHANGE 292 (2013) 
(concluding with suggested changes to institutional design for water storage and delivery in the San 
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In sum, the prescriptions offered by engineering studies generally come 
down to: (1) change the existing institutional arrangements to look more like 
modeled arrangements without regard to how that change can or should take place; 
and/or (2) do more modeling. Nonetheless, as previously noted, models can be 
useful for planning for climate change impacts, as a basis for deliberation, and as a 
catalyst for changing institutional arrangements. But, just because there is a 
possible engineering solution if the legal and social parameters are hypothetically 
changed, it does not mean that the engineering solution can change the legal and 
social parameters in reality. 
A. California and Optimization Model Research and Development 
A premise of this paper is that optimization models of California’s 
hydropower system are intended to be decision-support tools to assist with climate 
adaptation. To be fair, the intent behind developing optimization models, like any 
research product, is not singular.88 There are usually multiple researchers, as well 
as funding agency staff, involved in developing a model. And each has an 
individual mix of motives—ranging from professional development, personal 
interest, political considerations, altruistic intents, and availability of resources. 
However, the published justifications of modelers for the studies, the statutorily-
defined (and agency-interpreted) constraints on state funding, and the history of 
state agency involvement in oversight of and advice on optimization model 
research all tell a story of hope, that optimization models could be used to guide 
policy and dam operations in a way that incorporates or responds to changes in 
California’s climate. 
1. California Research Funding Constraints 
For the past two decades, the state of California’s support of research and 
development of optimization models has been contingent on that research being in 
the public interest and related to environmental protection. 
Somewhat counterintuitively, the public funding for energy-related public 
interest research89 came out of efforts to deregulate California’s energy industries. 
In 1996, then-Governor Pete Wilson signed AB 1890, The Electric Utility Industry 
Restructuring Act.90 The stated goal of the legislation was to “encourage 
 
Francisco Bay Area, although not focused on hydropower and without consideration to institutional 
feasibility of doing so). 
 88. See, e.g., AMY POTEETE, MARCO JANSSEN & ELINOR OSTROM, WORKING TOGETHER: 
COLLECTIVE ACTION, THE COMMONS, AND MULTIPLE METHODS IN PRACTICE (2010). 
 89. This includes CALVIN and INFORM. See discussion infra Sections III(A)(2), III(B) Electric 
Utility Industry Restructuring Act, 1996 Cal. Stat. 4505, 4529 (codified as amended at CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
CODE § 330 (West 2017)) (introduced as A.B. 1890, 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996)); CAL. ENERGY 
COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE RD&D PROVISIONS OF AB 1890 (1997), http://
www.energy.ca.gov/reports/1997-06-01_500-97-007.PDF [https://perma.cc/SPD4-CNPD] [hereinafter 
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE RD&D PROVISIONS OF AB 1890]. 
 90. 1 CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, FIVE-YEAR INVESTMENT PLAN, 2002 THROUGH 2006, FOR THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST ENERGY RESEARCH (PIER) PROGRAM REPORTING TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 
(2001), http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/2001-03-02_600-01-004A.PDF [https://perma.cc/99AM-
73TR]. 
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innovation, efficiency, and better service from all market participants, and will [sic] 
permit the reduction of costly regulatory oversight.”91 But, the legislation also 
contemplated future research and development, as did a California Public Utilities 
Commission decision that informed AB 1890.92 The Electric Industry Restructuring 
Policy Decision93 considered that “in the transition to a more competitive 
environment” research and development in the public interest had the potential to 
be overlooked and unfunded. The Restructuring Act reflected this concern, 
requiring a surcharge on investor-owned utilities’ retail sales to be directed to the 
California Energy Commission for public interest research and development 
activities that would likely be neglected by the competitive market.94 To implement 
AB 1890, the Energy Commission created the Public Interest Energy Research 
program (PIER). 
The mission of the program was to “conduct public interest energy 
research that seeks to improve the quality of life for California’s citizens by 
providing environmentally sound, safe, reliable and affordable energy services and 
products.”95 Within their portfolio, the Energy Commission delineated four major 
research areas. Of these, the “environmental research focus area” was the most 
broadly defined. The Energy Commission’s justification for environmental 
research was that “[w]henever energy is extracted, collected, transported, converted 
or utilized there are environmental impacts. The activities in these focus areas 
should be directed at better understanding and/or addressing the effects of those 
processes.”96 Although climate change is not directly addressed in the CEC’s 
strategic plan for implementing AB 1890, as one Energy Commission staff close to 
the PIER program noted, “The reasoning behind PIER was that the energy sector 
was largely responsible for GHG emission and should therefore be responsible for 
funding solutions to the problems created by those emissions.” 
The scope of PIER was unprecedented in California, and led to the 
creation of the first, second, and third California Climate Assessments.97 
Optimization models figure heavily in each of these assessments. Two of the 
models in particular deal with adapting California’s reservoir and hydropower 
systems to climate change. One of these is CALVIN, an economic-engineering 
optimization model of California’s water system developed at the University of 
 
 91. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(e) (West 2017); see also CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, STRATEGIC 
PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE RD&D PROVISIONS OF AB 1890, supra note 89, at 1-1. 
 92. 1 CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, FIVE-YEAR INVESTMENT PLAN, 2002 THROUGH 2006, FOR THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST ENERGY RESEARCH (PIER) PROGRAM REPORTING TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 
4 (2001) 
 93. D. 95-12-063, 64 CPUC2d 1 (1995). 
 94. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 381(a), (b) (West 2017). 
 95. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE RD&D PROVISIONS OF AB 
1890, supra note 89, at 2–3. 
 96. Id. 
 97. PIER funding was extended in S.B. 1194, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000), and A.B. 995, 
2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000), in 2000, but ended in 2012. Although research and development 
activities continue to be funded through the California Energy Commission, and those funds are from a 
surcharge on investor owned utilities, there are additional constraints to funding, which require in part 
that there be a direct benefit to IOU ratepayers. See S.B. 96, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) 
(regarding EPIC funding). 
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California, Davis.98 The other is INFORM, explicitly designed as a decision-
support model to integrate short and longer-term forecasts into hydropower dam 
operation.99 
2. Water and Energy Agency Advice and Oversight of Optimization Model 
Research and Development 
Beyond providing research funding to develop optimization models as 
decision-support tools, state and federal agencies have provided oversight and, in 
some cases, played an influential role in deciding the parameters and variables 
included in models. 
a. CALVIN 
The underlying objective of CALVIN is to inventory, quantify, and 
compare water flows through reservoir operations to show the potential for the 
state’s water system to respond under different operational constraints.100 CALVIN 
was conceived as a way to provide potential solutions to California’s complex and 
enduring water conflicts. In the words of the early modelers of CALVIN, the intent 
was to “provide[] an aid to placing local and other statewide planning efforts in 
context and giv[e] them greater focus” and to produce results that “have direct 
usefulness for policy, planning, finance, and operations planning problems 
regarding projected water scarcity at State, regional, and local levels.” 101 
The impetus for the CALVIN project and for its continual development 
came from a more targeted goal. In the late 1990s, Doug Wheeler, then California’s 
Secretary of Resources in the Wilson administration and former director of the 
Sierra Club, approached Henry Vaux, then University of California Associate Vice 
President for Programs, and researches at University of California Davis, about the 
possibility of conducting studies to assess opportunities for private sector 
investment in water infrastructure.102 Knowing that the administration would come 
to an end before the funding and the project would, Howitt, an economist, and 
Lund, engineer, at UC Davis created a proof-of-concept optimization model of 
California’s reservoir and conveyance system.103 
 
 98. See, e.g., University of California—Davis Statewide Economic-Engineering Water Model—
CALVIN, U.C. DAVIS CTR. FOR WATERSHED SCIS., https://watershed.ucdavis.edu/shed/lund/CALVIN/ 
(last visited Apr. 27, 2017). 
 99. See, e.g., Integrated Forecast and Management (INFORM), HYDROLOGIC RESEARCH CTR., 
http://www.hrc-lab.org/projects/dsp_projectSubPage.php?subpage=inform (last visited Apr. 27, 2017). 
 100. See University of California —Davis Statewide Economic-Engineering Water Model—CALVIN, 
supra note 98. 
 101. JAY R. LUND ET AL., UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA-DAVIS, WATER MANAGEMENT LESSONS FOR 
CALIFORNIA FROM STATEWIDE HYDRO-ECONOMIC MODELING USING THE CALVIN MODEL (2009), 
https://watershed.ucdavis.edu/shed/lund/CALVIN/ProjectHandoutNew.pdf [https://perma.cc/8887-
6X9Y]. 
 102. Interview with Jay Lund & Josué Medellin-Azuara, University of California, Davis. Davis, 
California (June 5, 2016) (notes on file with author); RICHARD E. HOWITT ET AL., STATE OF CAL. 
RESOURCES AGENCY, INTEGRATED ECONOMIC-ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA’S FUTURE 
WATER SUPPLY iii (1999). 
 103. See generally HOWITT ET AL., supra note 102. 
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From that point, CALFED,104 California Natural Resources Agency 
(CNRA), and CEC have continued to fund CALVIN and provide researchers with 
oversight and advisory committees. CALFED was the first to take over funding for 
the CALVIN project and gave it an advisory committee. The committee included 
representation from the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, 
Department of Water Resources, State Water Contractors, Kern County Water 
Agency, San Diego County Water Authority and the Environmental Defense 
Fund.105 During the CALFED funding, CALVIN went from “a running model that 
produces numbers, but you don’t believe them” to a “working model,” in that it 
produced “reasonable results.” 106 The main difference between the two in this case 
was detailed calibration, especially of hydrology. 
Starting around 2003, the California Energy Commission began to fund 
research to improve the model and apply it to climate change planning. While there 
was no oversight committee, draft reports received comments from Energy 
Commission and California Department of Water Resources (DWR) staff along 
with outside researchers107—all experts in their fields. However, no hydropower or 
regional water managers provided comments. 
In 2016, CALVIN research is still being funded by the California Natural 
Resources Agency, for a project on “Advancing Hydro-Economic Optimization to 
Identify Vulnerabilities, Tradeoffs, and Adaptation Opportunities in California’s 
Water System” as part of the Fourth California Climate Assessment.108 Additions 
to the model are also funded by a partnership between the U.S. Department of 
Energy, the Government of China, and the California Energy Commission109 to 
investigate changes in hydropower operation on stream flow temperatures for 
aquatic habitat under multiple climate scenarios. 
 
 104. CALFED was a collaboration between California and the Federal Government. See MARK 
LUBELL, ANDREA GERLAK & TANYA HEIKKILA, MAKING SPACE FOR THE RIVER 63 (Jeroen Frank 
Warner et al. eds., 2013); see also Giogos Kallis, Michael Kiparsky & Richard Norgaard, Collaborative 
Governance and Adaptive Management: Lessons from California’s CALFED Water Program, 12 
ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 631–643 (2009). 
 105. See University of California—Davis Statewide Economic-Engineering Water Model—CALVIN, 
supra note 98. Specifically the Advisory Committee included: “Anthony Saracino, Private Consultant 
(Chair); Fred Cannon, California Federal Bank; Duane Georgeson, Metropolitan Water District of 
Southern California; Jerry Gilbert, Private Consultant; Carl Hauge, California Department of Water 
Resources; Steve Macaulay, State Water Contractors and then California Department of Water 
Resources; Dennis O’Connor, California Research Bureau; Stu Pyle, Kern County Water Agency; 
Maureen Stapleton, San Diego County Water Authority; and David Yardas, Environmental Defense 
Fund” (acknowledgments page from 2009 description). Id. CALFED’s investment was for approximate 
$450,000 and led to the publication of the 2001 CALVIN report. 
 106. Interview with Jay Lund & Josué Medellin-Azuara, supra note 102. 
 107. See JAY R. LUND ET AL., CLIMATE WARMING & CALIFORNIA’S WATER FUTURE (2003), 
https://calvin.ucdavis.edu/files/content/page/CECReport2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8F6-HARX]. 
 108. At the time of writing, the research projects for California’s Fourth Assessment are ongoing. 
See Research and Tool Development, CAL. NAT. RESOURCES AGENCY, http://resources.ca.gov/climate/
safeguarding/research/ [https://perma.cc/8JEY-5W9J] (providing information on the research projects). 
 109. For more on the Department of Energy, China, and California Energy Commission research 
collaboration, see U.S./CHINA CLEAN ENERGY RESEARCH CENTER FOR WATER-ENERGY 
TECHNOLOGIES, cercwet.berkeley.edu (last visited Apr. 27, 2017). 
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b. INFORM 
INFORM started with the goal of improving the operation of a particular 
facility, the reservoir and dam at Folsom110—a federal project and a key part of the 
Central Valley Project (CVP).111 Researchers from Georgia Water Resource 
Institute along with the Hydrologic Research Center at San Diego (brothers Aris 
and Konstantine Georgakakos), developed a decision-support model to improve 
operations at Folsom for flood control, water delivery, and hydroelectric 
production.112 The main purpose of the model was to demonstrate the gains that 
could be achieved for multiple objectives if short and long-term weather and 
climate forecasts were considered in reservoir management.113 Later, the 
researchers added the goal of assisting decision-making in real time through 
integrating forecasts with an optimization model.114 Although the initial design 
began with a single reservoir, through funding and guidance from multiple 
California and federal agencies, the scope of the model was expanded to 
incorporate the largest dams in Northern California and those associated with the 
CVP and California State Water Project.115 
 
 110. Theresa M. Carpenter & Konstantine Georgakakos, Assessment of Folsom Lake Response to 
Historical and Potential Future Climate Scenarios: 1 Forecasting 249 J. OF HYDROLOGY 148 (2001); 
Huaming Yao & Aris Georgakakos, Assessment of Folsom Lake Response to Historical and Potential 
Future Climate Scenarios: 2. Reservoir Management, 249 J. OF HYDROLOGY 176 (2001); 
KONSTANTINE GEORGAKAKOS ET AL., HYDROLOGIC RESEARCH CTR. & GA. WATER RES. INST., 
INTEGRATED FORECAST AND RESERVOIR MANAGEMENT (INFORM), ENHANCEMENTS AND 
DEMONSTRATION RESULTS FOR NORTHERN CALIFORNIA (2008-2012)—FINAL PROJECT REPORT (2013), 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/publications/displayOneReport.php?pubNum=CEC-500-2014-019 
[https://perma.cc/YY4B-7RM2]; GUIDO FRANCO ET AL., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CLIMATE CHANGE 
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION PLAN: CONSULTANT REPORT 35 (2003), 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/2003-04-16_500-03-025FS.PDF [https://perma.cc/E53Q-LL5D] (The 
INFORM software is available for download from Georgia Water Resources Institute); see Integrated 
Forecast and Reservoir Management (INFORM) for Northern California, GA. WATER RESOURCES 
INST., http://www.gwri.gatech.edu/research/GWRI/INFORM [https://perma.cc/NM2X-XVVT] (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
  For additional information, see Integrated Forecast and Management (INFORM), supra note 
99; K.P. GEORGAKAKOS ET AL., HYDROLOGIC RESEARCH CTR. & GA. WATER RES. INST, CLIMATE 
CHANGE IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGING NORTHERN CALIFORNIA WATER RESOURCES IN THE LATTER 
21ST CENTURY: PIER FINAL PROJECT REPORT (2011), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2010publications/CEC
-500-2010-051/CEC-500-2010-051.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GQA-KWSF]. 
 111. The CVP is a massive infrastructure project that delivers water throughout California. 
 112. See Carpenter & Georgakakos, supra note 110, at 148; see also Yao & Georgakakos, supra 
note 110, at 176. 
 113. See Carpenter & Georgakakos, supra note 110, at 148–50; see also Yao & Georgakakos, supra 
note 110, at 176–78. 
 114. KONSTANTINE GEORGAKAKOS ET AL., INTEGRATED FORECAST AND RESERVOIR MANAGEMENT 
INFORM—A DEMONSTRATION FOR NORTHERN CALIFORNIA: PHASE 2 PROGRESS REPORT iii (2005), 
http://www.hrc-lab.org/projects/projectpdfs/INFORM_REPORTS/INFORM_phase1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Z46B-GRRH]. 
 115. See INFORM CORE OFFICE, HYDROLOGIC RESEARCH CTR. & GA. WATER RES. INST., 
SUMMARY OF MEETING PROCEEDINGS: FIRST OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE MEETING 
(2003), http://www.hrc-lab.org/projects/projectpdfs/OICWEB/OIC_MEETING_PROCEEDINGS/
SummaryMeetingProceedings_OIC-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GQA-ZQJK] [hereinafter FIRST 
OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE MEETING (2003)]; INFORM CORE OFFICE, 
HYDROLOGIC RESEARCH CTR. & GA. WATER RES. INST., SECOND OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION 
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Originally, staff at the Department of Water Resources rejected the idea of 
funding further research to develop a regional model for integrating forecasts into 
reservoir management. According to PIER research managers at the time, it was 
assumed that water managers would not accept the results and the math underlying 
the model was “too complex.”116 After the funding plan was first rejected, the 
research manager from the Energy Commission set up a meeting between DWR 
representatives and a well-respected water policy non-profit in California, the 
Pacific Institute, in hopes that the staff there could provide some insight on the 
underlying math, and push for the project. At the meeting, although the math was 
still not clear to anyone besides Georgakakos, the Pacific Institute staff supported 
the project and convinced all state parties to provide financial support and oversight 
to develop the decision support tool.117 
Funding for the project came from the PIER Program.118 The California 
Natural Resources Agency approved funding for the project at $4 million per year 
and encouraged the researchers to be as expansive as possible in their approach.119 
The project was jointly funded by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency 
(NOAA) as well. And it later received additional funding from CALFED. 
From the outset, the funding agencies and researchers agreed that for the 
demonstration of INFORM to be successful in California, it would depend on close 
collaboration between the modelers and hydropower managers.120 The importance 
of collaboration is expressed throughout the progress reports, summaries of 
meetings, and published peer-reviewed articles.121 The second progress report for 
the INFORM project, for example, states that “[t]he fundamental premise of the 
INFORM project is that the use of short- and long-term operational forecasts in 
water management can only be achieved [if demonstration and assessment sites 
meet specific] conditions.”122 Half of these conditions rely on communication and 
co-production between researchers, stakeholders, and “end-users”: 
 
COMMITTEE MEETING (2004), http://www.hrc-lab.org/projects/projectpdfs/OICWEB/OIC_MEETING
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[hereinafter SECOND OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE MEETING (2004)] ; INFORM 
CORE OFFICE, HYDROLOGIC RESEARCH CTR. & GA. WATER RES. INST., THIRD OVERSIGHT AND 
IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE INFORM PROJECT (2005), http://www.hrc-lab.org/
projects/projectpdfs/OICWEB/OIC_MEETING_PROCEEDINGS/SummaryMeetingProceedings_OIC-
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A2G-FH8U]; INFORM CORE OFFICE, HYDROLOGIC RESEARCH CTR. & GA. 
WATER RES. INST., FOURTH OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE 
INFORM PROJECT (2005), http://www.hrc-lab.org/projects/projectpdfs/OICWEB/OIC_MEETING_
PROCEEDINGS/SummaryMeetingProceedings_OIC-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4WZ-UY5H] 
[hereinafter FOURTH OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE MEETING (2005)]. 
 116. Interview with Guido Franco, California Energy Commission, Sacramento, CA. April 6, 2016 
(on , file with author). 
 117. Id.; see also telephone interview with Konstantine Georgakakos, Hydrologic Research Center, 
Scripps Institute of Oceanography, San Diego, CA. December 6, 2016 (notes on file with author). 
 118. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE RD&D PROVISIONS OF AB 
1890, supra note 89. 
 119. Id.; see also Interview with Guido Franco, supra note 116. 
 120. See, e.g., KONSTANTINE GEORGAKAKOS ET AL., supra note 114, at 1–2. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at 1-2  
Summer 2017 VALUES AND OPTIMIZATION OF HYDROPOWER 353 
(b) modelers, forecasters and managers have established a set of 
mutually-agreed-upon performance criteria to measure the 
effectiveness of decision policies; 
(c) a baseline quantitative system version is developed that 
reflects present management practices and operational models . . .  
(e) there is continuing participation of management staff in the 
demonstration activities and in user/modeler workshops for the 
mutual benefit of modelers, forecasters, and managers.123 
To facilitate collaboration and communication, the three funding 
agencies—NOAA, CALFED and CEC—formed an “Oversight and 
Implementation Committee” (OIC) which included representation from CVP 
operations at the Bureau of Reclamation, forecasters from NOAA, and 
representation from California DWR in addition to the team of INFORM 
researchers from Georgia Water Resources Institute and Scripps Institute of 
Oceanography and the funding agencies.124 The OIC facilitation allowed for greater 
familiarity with the project in management agencies and for data and system 
integration between INFORM and state and federal tools.125 
Initially, the project managers and researchers expected that tailoring 
INFORM to California reservoirs would take about three to four years, after which 
the intent was to test its use for changed climatic conditions using climate scenarios 
rather than short-term forecasts and actual conditions. In practice, it would be over 
ten years before INFORM was adopted as a real-time decision support tool. Water 
managers wanted a side-by-side demonstration of INFORM, testing it against 
actual reservoir practices in real time with real inputs.126 
B. How Do Hydropower Optimization Models Work? 
The history of California agency oversight and funding of CALVIN and 
INFORM suggests that the models were developed with an eye toward informing 
and supporting decision-making and planning for California hydropower. The 
process of including variables and parameters in an optimization function allows 
the models produce hypothetical scenarios that can inform policy and operations. 
Each model, though, optimizes differently. 
1. CALVIN 
The chief architect of CALVIN, Jay Lund,127 describes there being two 
key innovations of CALVIN: its database and its optimization solver. The database 
 
 123. Id. at 1-2, 1-3. 
 124. SUMMARY OF MEETING PROCEEDINGS: FIRST OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE 
MEETING (2003), supra note 115; SECOND OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE MEETING 
(2004), supra note 115. 
 125. See ARIS P. GEOGAKAKOS, KONSTANTINE GEOGAKAKOS, N.E. GRAHAM, INTEGRATED 
FORECAST AND RESERVOIR MANAGEMENT (INFORM) FOR NORTHERN CALIFORNIA: SYSTEM 
DEVELOPMENT AND INITIAL DEMONSTRATION i (2007). 
 126. FOURTH OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE INFORM PROJECT 
(2005), supra note 115. 
 127. CALVIN has benefitted from the work multiple teams of engineers, economists, and 
generations of graduate students. There have been well over 20 engineering masters theses and PhD 
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innovation was to include metadata and contact information for all data entries. 
Including data provenance was a primary concern when Lund began to work on the 
CALVIN project. He had done prior work creating an optimization model for the 
Columbia River basin and was dismayed at the lack of reliability of data on water 
flows. He came to realize that if he were ever to work on a similar project for 
California, the data needed to be accessible and verifiable for the model outputs to 
be acceptable. The data and metadata are the main body of CALVIN. 
While the Columbia River was the inspiration for CALVIN’s body, 
another river, the Missouri, gave CALVIN its heart. The optimization solver, HEC-
PRM. It is a computer program that retrieves data on water flows and animates the 
data by assigning values to flows throughout the reservoir system and “solving” the 
flows in a way that minimizes costs and maximizes gains for a particular goal. The 
end result is an “optimal” operations prescription, given the values assigned. The 
not-so-poetically-named HEC-PRM, or Hydrological Engineering Center’s 
Prescriptive Reservoir Model, was designed to assist the Army Corps of Engineers 
in determining coordinated operating rules for a six-reservoir system along the 
main stem of the Missouri River. 128 A primary purpose of the solver is to 
determine “optimal” operating rules or a “plan” for reservoir systems where there 
are multiple conflicting objectives that need to be met. 
This plan [the output of the model] will identify the priorities to 
be assigned to conflicting objectives of operation. For example, 
the plan will determine whether water should be released from a 
reservoir if a demand exists for downstream flow for wildlife 
protection but a conflicting demand exists for continued storage 
of the water for recreation.129 
The creators of HEC-PRM favored using weighted values to express 
social and environmental costs in the same terms as economic costs of operation in 
order to balance multiple objectives of operation and “permit display of trade-offs 
in operation for various purposes.”130 HEC-PRM’s modeled reservoir system can 
only be constrained by a few input parameters. Of these, they tend to be physical 
constraints, for example, the outlet capacity of a reservoir. The user manual notes 
that “inviolable constraints on system operation are used frugally.”131 As 
 
dissertations on improvements to and new applications of the CALVIN model. Many of these students 
went on to work for the State Water Resources Control Board, the California Department of Water 
Resources, and utilities—notably the chief hydropower modeler for Pacific Gas and Electric. And, as 
noted earlier, it has had several advisory committees. But if any single person could be fairly pointed to 
as the primary architect and custodian of the model it would be Jay Lund, a professor of engineering at 
University of California at Davis. See University of California—Davis Statewide Economic-Engineering 
Water Model—CALVIN, U.C. DAVIS CTR. FOR WATERSHED SCIENCES, supra note 98. 
 128. INÊS C.L. FERREIRA & JAY R. LUND, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, OPERATING RULES FROM 
HEC-PRM RESULTS FOR THE MISSOURI RIVER SYSTEM: DEVELOPMENT AND PRELIMINARY TESTING xi 
(1994), http://www.hec.usace.army.mil/publications/ProjectReports/PR-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X6W-
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justification, the manual quotes two Rand Corporation economists, Hitch and 
McKean stating that “casually selected or arbitrary constraints can easily increase 
system costs or degrade system performance many fold, and lead to solutions that 
would be unacceptable to the person who set the constraints in the first place.” 132 
The design choice in HEC-PRM was to limit inviolable constraints and instead rely 
on value functions to impose operation limits; “[f]or example, instead of specifying 
maximum flow requirements for flood control, the system model should represent 
this objective through high costs of failure to maintain flows or storage levels 
below flood stage.”133 And so social and environmental considerations are 
weighted in economic terms too. 
For the optimization solver to function, certain parameters and categories 
of variables need to be defined. First, the set of concerns between trade-offs needs 
to be defined and have decipherable values. Flood control in CALVIN, for 
example, is about how much water can be stored in a reservoir, not about where 
civic infrastructure is built.134 There is a defined, and single, cost to decreasing 
environmental flows in a stream—not an array of costs based on who is carrying 
the burden from decreased flows. Second, from the beginning, in order for the 
trade-offs to be calculated, CALVIN depends on a centralized, coordinated system, 
which can immediately adjust to changes in preferences, without costs or delays 
from changing operating rules. In other words, in order to perform its optimization 
function, CALVIN needs to have a representation of a legal and political system 
that is quite unlike the one we have. 
 
 132. Id. at 9–10. It should be noted that the economists who the authors of the HEC-PRM model cite 
as the justification for the USACE design choice were neither discussing water allocation nor were they 
dead set against balancing choices not expressed in commensurable terms. The quote comes from a 
Rand Corporation report, the purpose of which was to demonstrate the usefulness of applying economic 
thinking—defined in the report as “trying to make the most efficient use of the resources available”—to 
military problems in the nuclear age. See C.J. HITCH & R. MCKEAN, THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE IN 
THE NUCLEAR AGE v (1960) In the section that USACE quotes from, Hitch and McKean were 
presenting what to do about “incommensurables”—i.e., gains and costs that cannot be expressed in a 
“generally acceptable” common unit, for example the value of human life, id. at 183–87, or the “the 
diplomatic trouble and risks involved in various overseas countries [in planning bombing attacks.]” Id. 
at 186. They argue that when the policy analysis exercise is to compare two or more options, at least one 
of which has an incommensurable element, it is “far preferable” to put some kind of monetary valuation 
on the incommensurable element for comparison’s sake rather than “placing limiting constraints on the 
solution” [the example they provide is “rul[ing] out all solutions in which casualty rates exceed a certain 
arbitrary percentage” or “declaring certain countries off-bounds [for overseas basing.]” Id. at 186. But, 
even still, Hitch and McKean state that “[s]ome [] constraints on an analysis are necessary and justified” 
and that is valuation of incommensurables is “not very useful” if “all the leading alternatives involve 
significant and different incommensurables.” Id. at 186 n.6. The two economists go on to outline 
additional analysis options that may be preferable to trying to assign numerical value to objectives that 
are by their nature incommensurable with quantification. For example, “In some cases where systems 
achieve incommensurable objectives, the analyst may be able to design another system which is better at 
achieving some things and as good, or almost as good, at achieving the others. . . . In many cases the 
analyst’s ingenuity may be more rewardingly exercised in trying to find ways of satisfying multiple 
objectives than in devising common measures for them. It can be argued that the chief gain from 
systemic analysis is the stimulus that it provides for the invention of better systems.” Id. at 187. 
 133. CARL, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, supra note 129, at 10. 
 134. Cf. GILBERT F. WHITE, CHOICE OF ADJUSTMENT TO FLOODS (1964). 
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2. INFORM 
INFORM, as with its predecessor model focused on Folsom operations, 
was designed to support decision-making at multiple timescales.135 The short- and 
midrange model is designed with an hourly resolution and a duration of one 
month.136 The long-range model has a monthly resolution with a horizon of one 
year. Each timescale has different management objectives.137 Short term objectives 
focus on maximizing daily energy generation, and/or maximizing the value of daily 
energy, considering minimum flow requirements, energy prices (“as a function of 
power demand”), and the times that a given hydropower plant is committed to 
operate at capacity (“dependable capacity commitments”). 138 The long- and mid-
range decision model is designed to “determine reservoir release and level 
sequences that satisfy Folsom’s long-term objectives—flood control, hydropower 
generation, water supply, environmental protection, and drought management.” 139 
Between each model run timescale, and with the support of the modeled 
results, the INFORM designers anticipate specific kinds of decision-making in a 
particular sequence. The long-range model is designed to run first, to support 
deliberations between the planning departments of hydropower management 
agencies to make “key decisions” on “water supply contracts, reservoir releases, 
energy generation, and reservoir coordination strategies.”140 Output from the short- 
and midrange models are intended for operational decisions (e.g., power plant 
scheduling, water supply and flood management), and so are intended to support 
the “operational departments” of management agencies. 141 And the results of the 
hourly time resolution model for turbine dispatch are intended to be used for “near 
real time operations.”142 Each of the layers is designed so that outputs of one 
informs the others. 143 
Like CALVIN, INFORM depends on weighting performance metrics to 
signify levels of importance among reservoir objectives.144 The highest weight is 
imposed on parameters in order to find sequences that first meet the pool level 
constraints of reservoirs and avoid flood damage. An intermediate weight is 
assigned to limit those sequences to ones that maintain “high feasible reservoir 
 
 135. Yao & Georgakakos, supra note 110, at 183. 
The Folsom decision module is designed to support reservoir management decisions 
pertaining to multiple time scales. Specifically, this module consists of (a) a long/mid-
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levels.”145 From there, a minimal weight is assigned to select those that 
“additionally optimize power efficiency.” 146 The “optimal” choices are found using 
the “Extended Linear Quadratic Guassian” or ELQG, also developed by Aris 
Georgakakos and H Yao.147 The exception to this design lies with the treatment of 
minimum environmental flows. “The minimum release [from reservoirs] . . . is set 
to 100 cfs [cubic feet per second] to accommodate downstream environmental and 
water supply requirements.” 148 Model users, though, determine the acceptable 
amount of water in reservoirs, and the risk from exceeding limits defined from rule 
curves.149 
The result of the weighting and strict rules for minimum flows in 
INFORM roughly matches legal considerations. Minimum environmental flows are 
a strict requirement, and flood control is weighted more heavily than hydropower 
generation or water storage. 
Although individual laws for hydropower operation are not mentioned in 
the OIC meeting summaries, there are several instances in which researchers 
depended on representatives, from federal and state hydropower reservoir 
managing agencies, to determine parameters for the INFORM model. For example, 
lead researchers (co-Principal Investigators, or co-PIs) were required to work with 
the Committee’s contacts at DWR and the Bureau of Reclamation to “define the 
link between the Bay Area management objectives with the objectives of the 
INFORM reservoirs.”150 In this way, the OIC may have provided a mechanism for 
coherence between the rules and laws that form the context for the work managers 
and operators and the parameters that constrain the algorithm in INFORM. 
Even with positive, believable results, and inclusion of stakeholders, and 
even though the DWR wanted to fund the actual use of INFORM, the department 
was unable to allocate money to the project until several years into the recent 
drought (2015), well over a decade since INFORM was first funded by California. 
Still, DWR is tailoring the model for just one river system and only for state (and 
not federally) controlled dams, at that; only one of the dams in this system has a 
hydroelectric generation facility, and the tailoring and implementation process is 
still expected to take two additional years before it is operational.151 
It is important to note that although CALVIN and INFORM are both 
optimization models, they are very different types of decision-support tools. The 
“time-steps” for CALVIN are monthly and seasonal—coarser than INFORM’s 
nested hourly, daily, monthly, and seasonal time-steps. The choice of time-step 
relates to the types of decisions both models are intended to influence. CALVIN is 
 
 145. Id. at 188 
 146. Id. 
 147. See generally Aris P. Georgakakos, Huaming Yao, & Yongqing Yu, A Control Model for 
Dependable Hydropower Capacity Optimization, 33 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 2349 (1997). 
 148. Yao & Georgakakos, supra note 110, at 187. 
 149. Id. 
 150. SUMMARY OF MEETING PROCEEDINGS: FIRST OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE 
MEETING (2003), supra note 115, at 5. 
 151. Personal communication with M. Anderson, Department of Water Resources, April 2016 (on 
file with author). 
358 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 57 
intended for large-scale investments and planning152 whereas INFORM is intended 
to support daily operations of hydropower dams in addition to longer-term 
planning. Finally, how the two models treat the task of optimization is different. 
CALVIN looks at the system of reservoirs across multiple rivers and trades 
objectives throughout. INFORM looks at individual reservoirs, in addition to larger 
reservoir networks, and trades uncertainty across objectives over time. Both models 
“work” in that they produce outcomes that are optimized for the conditions set in 
the models. They determine operational rules that produce more electricity, more 
environmental flows, and still manage to reliably store more water while improving 
flood prevention, all on the virtual rivers153 represented in the models. But the 
translation from rules developed for the virtual river back into reality does not 
occur on a 1:1 basis. 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS CRITIQUE APPLIED TO 
CALVIN/INFORM 
The relationships among law, history, and values are important to models 
precisely because the models do not recognize them—making the models’ 
weighted trade-offs between uses in the models suspect. INFORM and CALVIN 
both attempt to model a system that is governed by inconsistent sets of laws that 
change from dam to dam and make the system clear enough so that they can 
calculate which allocations of water are optimal across the system. This is not an 
easy task, but in simplifying or ignoring the institutional arrangements that govern 
hydropower dams in California, the modelers swapped one set of institutional 
arrangements (heterogenous and slow moving with the potential for conflict and 
conflict resolution) for another (centralized, coordinated, without admission of the 
existence of conflicts, let alone their resolution). Each of these systems, the one we 
live with and the ones in CALVIN and INFORM, will produce different values—
and take different values into account to begin with. 
One could argue that value is included in optimization models through the 
use of the Lagrange multiplier (CALVIN), or penalty parameters (INFORM), or 
the inclusion of inviolable minimum streamflows in models—all of which serve to 
designate the relative importance of multiple objectives of reservoir management, 
in theory, similar to how law designates relative importance. 
But, even if the use of penalty parameters and Lagrange multipliers were a 
reflection of value, it is still a distorted reflection. The quantitative weighting of 
values employed in optimization models creates a different sort of balancing than 
the qualitative assessments of value used in political and legal processes.154 
Qualitative assessments are necessary for conflict resolution because values can 
 
 152. See supra discussion in Part I. See also interview with Jay Lund & Josué Medellin-Azuara, 
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conflict and evolve.155 This is evident in the history of hydropower governance, 
among other places. Over the past several decades, for example, there has been 
more emphasis placed on environmental protection and instream flows as well as 
coordination between agencies.156 Quantitative valuation, though, depends on static 
values, which are assigned in a way that negates the possibility of conflict within 
models. 
Additionally, the parameters that define how the quantitative values in 
models like CALVIN and INFORM operate, and allow them to operate, are 
extremely different from procedural rules in reality. Modelers for INFORM and 
CALVIN created virtual hydropower systems that are centrally controlled, and in 
which coordination between reservoirs is assumed to be possible and instantaneous. 
In contrast, the process for changing parameters to reallocate water across the 
virtual systems is near instantaneous. The process for changing institutional 
arrangements in actual hydropower system is varied depending on dam type, 
location, and historical context. Changing the rules for a FERC license, for 
example, depends on the specifics of that license, like whether the license has a 
reopener clause or is up for renewal, and so forth. Changing the flood control rule 
curves of a dam depends on the willingness and financial means of the Army Corps 
of Engineers to undertake a study to rewrite the rules and comply with NEPA. 
V. WHAT NOW? POTENTIAL RESEARCH AND NEXT STEPS FOR 
INCLUDING LEGAL CONTEXT INTO OPTIMIZATION MODELS 
Optimization models are playgrounds in which users can experiment with 
different policy and operation scenarios. The playground, and all the toys and 
structures in it, have been arranged just so. The trouble with the “just so-ness” of 
the grounds is that it is arranged in line with the preferences of engineers, not the 
preferences or concerns of decision-makers. So, how can the playground be 
redesigned to encourage decision-makers to play? How can optimization models be 
re-worked to include socio-legal context? 
It should be noted, that there is no shortage of resistance to the idea of 
including law and politics in optimization models. Carl Bauer, a political 
economist, once asked Lund about whether CALVIN incorporated politics. Lund 
replied that it didn’t, because if it did, “the model wouldn’t work.”157 In conducting 
background research for this paper, the engineers and economists I spoke with 
regularly noted their strong belief that the “problem” was with policy people, not 
with the models. 
Engineers are trained in engineering, not history, law, or politics. It would 
be unfair and unreasonable to expect modelers to be something they are not trained 
to be. But would it be fair and reasonable to re-think how engineers are taught and 
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what they are taught? Could broader inclusion of social science and humanities 
help engineers think through how their products fit into social settings? 
Even if engineers were trained to think through social context more 
thoroughly, could models capture even just formal law sufficiently? The network of 
laws that govern hydropower in California is evolving, complex, and multiple (as 
discussed above in Part II). Those characteristics would be difficult to integrate into 
models in which all dams are treated as equivalent—a design choice made to 
simplify programming and minimize computer model run time. Could including 
lessons from the development of artificial intelligence be incorporated into 
decision-making tools for resources? What is gained or lost by using computer 
code as the lexicon for balancing multiple objectives and values? Can code 
legitimately function as the language of dispute resolution? 
What about less direct methods of shaping optimization models? Can 
close collaboration and coproduction of models with individuals who are intimately 
aware of how the legal constraints and connections work on the ground—whether 
managers or operators—allow for a way to include preferences and values specific 
to the time of their creation? 
The history of the development of INFORM may provide an example of 
this type of coproduction. INFORM had a very active oversight committee in 
which the managers of the existing real systems helped to shape choices in model 
design. That collaboration between the designers and practitioners, who must work 
within the world of politics and conflict, may have provided a way to include that 
context in the model, even if not directly, and make it more likely to be adopted. 
Even still, the history of INFORM suggests that coproduction is not a guarantee for 
success, or at least immediate success. It took an extreme event (prolonged 
drought) before the Department of Water Resources could fund even partial 
implementation of INFORM. Future research should be done to investigate the 
potential for coproduction, or transdisciplinarity, to overcome the gaps between the 
virtual reality of optimization tools and the world in which decisions are actually 
made. 
